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ABSTRACT
Complementing existing work on firm organizational structure and productivity, this paper examines
the impact of organizational change on workers. We find evidence that employers do appear to
compensate at least some of their workers for engaging in high performance workplace practices.
We also find a significant association between high performance workplace practices and increased
wage inequality. Finally, we examine the relationship between organizational structure and
employment changes and find that some practices, such as self-managed teams, are associated with
greater employment reductions, while other practices, such as the percentage of workers involved
in job rotation, are associated with lower employment reductions.
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1. Introduction 
In response to intensified foreign and domestic competition, many American 
companies have tried to improve company performance through the more effective use of 
their workforce.  Businesses have re-organized and reengineered their workplaces to 
incorporate what have been labeled High Performance Workplace (HPW) practices.  
Examples of such workplace practices include employee involvement programs, job 
rotation, self-managed teams, company provided training, and incentive-based 
compensation plans.  Organizations that utilize HPW practices may make more efficient 
use of labor by drawing upon the ideas of a broader range of employees than more 
traditional forms of work organization. 
Evidence in the literature suggests that the organizational structure of a firm has a 
significant impact on labor productivity.
1
  This finding leaves one wondering:  How do 
workers fare?  This paper addresses this issue by answering the following questions.  
First, how does a more interactive organizational structure affect the level of wages?  
Second, how does this type of organizational structure affect relative wages within an 
establishment?  Third, how is organizational structure related to employment changes? 
We hypothesize that HPW practices are likely to benefit workers because workers 
would be less willing to contribute in the manner these practices require unless they are 
assured a share of the gains (this is also argued in Osterman, 2000).  We examine this 
directly and find that wages of workers employed in businesses that use HPW practices 
are higher than wages for workers employed in more traditionally organized firms.  This   4
is especially true for managers, supervisors, and technical workers in unionized 
establishments.   
Researchers have posited many theories as to why wage inequality has increased 
since 1980 in the United States.  Much of the debate on the worsening position of 
unskilled workers has focused on the role of technological factors (see Berman, Bound 
and Griliches (1994)), along with other factors such as trade, declining unionzation, and 
falling real minimum wages.  In this paper, we add an additional dimension to the 
discussion on inequality – the role of innovation in the organization of work.   As argued 
in Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa (1999), the impact of organizational change on 
inequality is theoretically ambiguous, both for an economy as a whole and for specific 
employers.  This, therefore, becomes an empirical question.  When we examine how 
organizational change has affected the relative wages of nonproduction versus production 
workers, we find that implementing a wide range of HPW practices does seem to be 
associated with higher inequality within employers.    
Organizational change can both alter the skill requirements within different 
occupational classifications and the relative demand for different occupational classes.  
Work by Caroli and Van Reenen (1999) and Osterman (2000) suggests that 
organizational change may be “skilled biased”.  When we examine the association 
between HPW and employment changes, we find a mixed picture.  Some practices, such 
as self-managed teams, are associated with greater employment reductions while other 
practices, such as the percentage of workers involved in job rotation, are associated with 
lower employment reductions.   5
To examine these three outcomes (wages, wage inequality and employment 
changes), we use a unique nationally representative sample of manufacturing 
establishments drawn from the Educational Quality of the Workforce National Employer 
Survey, EQW-NES.  This survey is composed of two waves of interviews of  
representative samples of U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing establishments in 
1993 and 1996, including a panel of approximately 700 establishments.  The survey  has 
a higher response rate than most previous surveys, and it contains very detailed 
information on specific employer workplace practices, including changes in the 
organization of work and investments in new technology.  The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows:  Section 2 briefly surveys previous work on the three outcomes of 
interest and their relationship to workplace practices, Section 3 summarizes the data used, 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Background Discussion   
Workplace Innovation and Wages   
  One might expect that those practices which raise the productivity of a firm would 
have an impact on pay for a number of reasons.  First, if there were any applicability of 
the skills associated with high performance workplace practices outside the firm, workers 
would command a higher wage.   Non-managerial workers who have learned how to 
work in self-managed teams may also become more valuable to other employers as they 
acquire problem solving and interpersonal skills.  Additionally, to overcome resistance to 
change, supervisors may have to be paid a wage premium to ensure that they actively 
participate in (rather than undermine) work practices that require them to be a facilitator 
of groups of workers engaged in problem solving. These worker groups might otherwise   6
be viewed as a challenge to the authority and job security of a supervisor.  Firms that are 
undergoing substantial re-organization may also have to pay a compensating wage 
differential to make-up for the increased job insecurity associated with rapid work re-
organization.  At the same time, workplaces that are undergoing substantial change in 
work organization may generate increased concerns about job security that may temper 
worker demands for increased wages.   
Wages could also be higher to reflect efficiency wages, where increased 
responsibility and firm-specific capital generated by the introduction of high performance 
workplace practices increases the cost to the firm of worker turnover.  (In contrast, 
turnover costs might also be lower if job rotation reduces unique skills and new work 
practices move knowledge away from workers.)  In addition, one could consider a rent-
sharing argument as to why wages could be higher; workers, especially unionized 
workers, may be able to bargain for a share of the higher productivity generated by the 
use of high performance workplace organization.  Finally, employers who introduce 
profit-sharing or stock options to their employees may at the same time lower average 
regular wages (excluding profit sharing) to increase incentives while paying workers a 
sufficiently high expected wage as to maintain market compensation 
There has been relatively little work that has examined the impact of workplace 
innovation on the pay of workers.  One way to examine the impact of technological and 
organization change is to examine the impact of these factors on the rate of growth of 
average wages.  For example, Osterman (2000) has examined the impact of work 
reorganization on the change in wages from 1992-1997 and found little impact of HPW 
practices on wages.   Cappelli and Neumark (1999) using the EQW-NES (but for a   7
restricted sample of manufacturing establishments that have been in existence since at 
least 1977) find some evidence that workplace practices, such as benchmarking and total 
quality management, are positively related to average labor costs per worker.  But their 
study does not examine changes in wages and how they are affected by changes in 
workplace practices over time, nor do they examine how the pay of different categories 
of workers (managers, supervisors, technical workers, clerical/sales workers and 
production workers) is affected by these workplace practices.  Cappelli and Carter (2000) 
find evidence that HPW practices are associated with higher wages for production 
workers in manufacturing but their results disappear when controls for human capital are 
included.  In addition, they do not examine how changes in wages might be associated 
with changes in HPW practices; as a result, their findings may be biased due to 
unobserved establishment heterogeneity.
 
  Many researchers have argued that computers have had a significant impact on 
workers wages but this, too, remains a controversial issue. Krueger (1993) found that 
workers who worked with computers were paid approximately 15 percent more than 
similar workers who did not work with computers.  However, DiNardo and Pischke 
(1996) found similar effects for workers who used a pencil at work, suggesting perhaps 
this finding might be driven by omitted variable bias.   Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), 
using plant-level data on a sub-sample of manufacturing businesses that was matched 
with micro data on a sample of individuals within each of their establishments, also found 
a positive relationship between computers and other advanced technologies on the one 
hand and pay and labor productivity on the other hand.  However, this relationship 
appears somewhat fragile when researchers use longitudinal rather than cross section   8
data.  In this paper, we will use a measure of the diffusion of computers within an 
establishment to examine how technology has affected workers wages by occupational 
class.  Since we have both cross section and longitudinal data, we will be able to examine 
how robust the relationship between computers and wages is. 
 Workplace Innovation and Wage Inequality 
  Theoretically, as discussed in Kremer and Maskin (1996), Acemoglu (1998) and 
reviewed in Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa (1999), when technological and 
organizational change take place, skill homogeneity can increase within firms.  This 
would suggest that inequality would decrease within a firm with organizational 
innovation, even as it rises across firms.  However, Aghion et. al. (1999) point out that 
the outcome is uncertain and in fact there are reasons to think that just the opposite may 
happen.  If firms, as they introduce more organizational practices that have a higher skill 
component, choose to promote and retrain the low skilled workers within the firm, the 
inequality in the firm may decline.  However, if the firms fire the moderately low-skilled 
workers (retaining the very low-skilled for menial tasks) and replace them with externally 
skilled workers (instead of retraining the existing low-skilled workers), inequality within 
the firm would then increase.  As a result, the impact of organizational innovation on 
inequality within a firm is ambiguous and remains an empirical issue.  In addition, if 
some workers (such as managers and supervisors) are paid a relatively higher premium to 
engage in HPW practices relative to production workers we may observe increased wage 
inequality within an establishment.   9
Workplace Innovation and Employment Changes 
  If technical and organizational change are complementary activities, as argued by 
Bresnahan et. al. (1999), and given that there is evidence that technical change is skilled 
biased, this suggests that organizational change may also be skill biased.  Osterman 
(2000) finds that measures of new organizational practices are associated with higher 
layoff rates of production workers, even within firms that have been experiencing net 
employment gains.  This is suggestive of the reallocation process hypothesized by 
Kremer and Maskin (1996) and Acemoglu (1998).  Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) find 
evidence for British and French employers that a variety of workplace practices are 
associated with lower relative demand for unskilled production workers.  Therefore, we 
will examine both the association between HPW practices and total employment changes 
as well as for production workers alone. 
In any analysis of the impact of organizational change on outcomes of interest, it 
is important to consider who is adopting these practices and how this might affect the 
interpretation of the results.  While there is still relatively little analysis across a 
representative sample of employers as to who adopts HPW practices, there is some 
indication in the work by Black, Krivelyova, Lynch (2001), Boning, Ichniowski, Shaw 
(2001), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, Hitt (1999), and Osterman (1994) that there is 
complementarity between the adoption of information technology and HPW practices.  
Other factors that appear to be associated with the adoption of HPW practices include the 
education of the workforce (Black, Krivelyova, Lynch (2001)), the participation of the 
business in local employer networks (Erikson and Jacoby (2003)), and the financial 
position of the business.  For this last factor the literature is mixed, with work by Nickell,   10
Nicolitsas, and Patterson (1996) suggesting that firms that are doing badly are more likely 
to innovate while others suggesting that, since the innovations are expensive, only those 
firms that can “afford” financially to do so do.  While the empirical analysis below does 
not explicitly account for characteristics of those who have adopted HPW practices, the 
question of who adopts clearly affects the final interpretation of our results. 
 
3.  The Data 
  The first round of the EQW National Employers Survey was administered by the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census as a telephone survey in August and September 1994 to a 
nationally representative sample of more than 3,000 private establishments with more 
than 20 employees
2.  The survey represents a unique source of information on how 
employers recruit workers, organize work, invest in physical capital, and utilize education 
and training investments.  The survey over-sampled establishments in the manufacturing 
sector and establishments with more than 100 employees.  Public sector employees, not-
for-profit institutions, and corporate headquarters were excluded from the sample.  The 
target respondent in the manufacturing sector was the plant manager and in the non-
manufacturing sector was the local business site manager.  However, the survey was 
designed to allow for multiple respondents so that information could be obtained from 
establishments that kept financial information such as the book value of capital or the 
cost of goods and materials used in production at a separate finance office (typically at 
corporate headquarters for multi-establishment enterprises).  The sample frame for the 
survey was the Bureau of the Census SSEL file, one of the most comprehensive and up-
to-date listings of establishments in the United States.  Although the sampling frame   11
omits establishments with less than 20 employees, it captures establishments that employ 
approximately three-quarters of all workers in the U.S. 
The response rate in the first round EQW National Employers Survey for 
manufacturing establishments was 75 percent.  This is substantially higher than most 
other voluntary establishment surveys.  Of the 1,831 manufacturing establishments who 
participated in the survey, not all respondents completed all parts of the survey by the 
interview cutoff date of October 1, 1994.  Therefore, the final number of manufacturing 
establishments in the sample for which all parts of the survey were completed was 1,621.  
This represents a 66 percent completed survey response rate. 
 A second survey was administered by the Census Bureau in August 1997
3.  There 
was oversampling of establishments in California, Kentucky, Michigan, Maryland and 
Pennsylvania and a subsample of establishments that had been contacted in the first 
round.  The final sample of completed interviews for the second round of the EQW-NES 
included 2,479 manufacturing establishments, representing a 63 percent response rate.  A 
panel of 766 establishments (approximately 2/3
rd  manufacturing and 1/3
rd non-
manufacturing) can be constructed between the two rounds of the EQW-NES.  The panel 
response rate (for first round manufacturing and non-manufacturing establishments who 
were contacted and completed the interview in the second round) was 74 percent.  
However, the second survey was considerably longer in duration than the first survey 
(close to 45 minutes) and there was a high rate of break-offs mid interview.  Therefore, in 
spite of the high overall response rate there are many businesses that do not provide 
information on all questions asked including items such as the value of shipments and 
sales, the book value of the capital stock, wages paid to workers and the proportion of   12
workers trained
4
.  This significantly reduces the final sample sizes used for analysis in 
this paper.
5  In addition, due to limited sampling of non-manufacturing establishments in 
the EQW longitudinal panel of establishments, we have focused our work just on the 
manufacturing sector, which has a higher response rate overall.   
There are many measures that have been used by various researchers to capture 
HPW practices.  These include job rotation, benchmarking, TQM, profit sharing, teams, 
employee participation in decision making, indicators of how flat or hierarchical a firm 
is, employee-supervisor ratios, and workplace training.  These measures have been 
collected as continuous values (such as the percentage of employees meeting regularly to 
discuss workplace issues) or in binary format (such as whether there is any job rotation or 
training).  While the quality of the EQW data is high as indicated by the high response 
rate and the fact that the Census Bureau conducted the survey, measurement error could 
be important, especially when examining changes in practices.   
In the empirical work that follows, we estimate both cross section and differenced 
equations.  By estimating a first differenced or fixed effect model we hope to control for 
any unobserved but time invariant heterogeneity of establishments that may bias our 
estimates.  But while fixed effects estimation may address this bias, if there is 
measurement error in the data then differencing may amplify measurement error bias that 
could result in finding no significant effects for the explanatory variables.   
For ease of interpretation, we have decided in this paper to proxy for HPW 
practices (such employees meeting) in a binary fashion rather than as continuous 
measures.  We take continuous measures of the diffusion of HPW practices, such as the 
proportion of non-managerial workers meeting regularly to discuss workplace issues, and   13
recode this into a binary format for ease of interpretation.  We recode the variable using 
the median value in our sample as the cutoff point.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the workplace practices that we examine in 
this paper.
6
  Our measure of technology is a binary variable equal to one if more than 30 
percent of the workers in the establishment use computers in their work.  The first 
column presents mean values for the 1996 cross section and the next two columns present 
mean values for the panel subsample that we will use in our fixed effects estimation.  In 
1996 over 55 percent of establishments had 30 percent or more of their workers using 
computers and this percentage rose over the period 1993 to 1996. 
Other workplace practice measures we use include binary variables equal to one if 
at least 20 percent of non-managerial workers were in self-managed teams, 50 percent or 
more of production workers had been trained in the past year, 20 percent or more of 
workers were involved in job rotation, and 50 percent or more of non-managerial workers 
met regularly to discuss workplace issues.  Looking at the means for the panel sample we 
see that the diffusion of these practices increased over the 1993-1996 period.  The only 
workplace practice that was used less over this period was profit sharing.  This measure is 
set to one if any group of workers was eligible to participate in profit sharing.  Eighty five 
percent of establishments in the panel had some type of profit sharing in place in 1993 
but this had fallen to 61 percent by 1996.  While the panel sample is considerably smaller 
than the cross section sample, it looks very similar to the cross section except that the 
panel sample establishments are slightly larger on average and they have lower turnover.   14
While employers seemed to have adopted more HPW practices over the 1993-
1996 period, Table 2 shows that there appears to still be a fair amount of switching going 
on in both directions.  While some employers adopted job rotation, others dropped it or 
used it for a smaller percentage of their workers.  For most of our HPW measures, two 
thirds to three quarters of the establishments did not change their usage of these practices 
over the 1993-1996 period, with even 55 percent of employers maintaining the same 
training investment level over this period. 
4.  The Empirical Results 
Wages 
  Do establishments compensate workers for their increased involvement in the 
production process and for incurring the risk associated with profit sharing forms of 
compensation?  To examine this question, we estimate wage equations using the log of 
the average establishment hourly wage, first at the establishment level and then by 
occupation within the establishment, as the dependent variable.   
  Table 3a presents estimates from cross-section wage equations using the 1996 
survey data and for the subsample drawn from the panel data.  The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of average hourly wages for workers.  We construct the average 
wage by using information on average hourly wages paid for each of five occupational 
classes – managers, supervisors, technical staff, production workers, and clerical/sales 
workers.  We then weight these wages by their employment share to construct the 
establishment average wage.  We use this same strategy to construct the average 
education within the establishment.   15
The relationships we observe are quite similar to those we saw when estimating 
the impact of high performance workplace practices on productivity (Black and Lynch, 
2001), which suggests that these establishments do compensate workers for participating 
in workplace practices that increase productivity under certain circumstances.  The results 
are quite similar across samples.  Consistent with the literature using individual level 
data, higher average education in the establishment is associated with higher average 
wages; the magnitude suggests that a one year increase in average education raises 
average hourly wages by 10-13%.  Computer use also has a significant impact; 
establishments with more than 30% of workers using computers pay 7-10% more on 
average.  Larger establishments pay higher wages but establishments with more women 
pay lower wages.  Establishments with more turnover also pay lower wages, everthing 
else constant.
7 
  When we examine the impact of HPW practices and measures of employee voice 
on wages, we find that unionized employers pay about 10% more than non-unionized 
businesses.  Only when we allow for interactions between unionization status and other 
workplace practices (Columns 2 and 4), do we see any HPW practices having a 
significant association with wages.  Those unionized establishments with a high 
proportion of non-managerial workers meeting on a regular basis to discuss workplace 
issues pay higher average wages.  This last finding is consistent with establishment 
productivity; Black and Lynch (2001) found higher productivity in unionized 
establishments that had a higher proportion of workers meeting.   
  In Table 3b we examine the average wage in each establishment by occupation 
group, where the occupation groups include managers, supervisors, technical workers,   16
production workers, and clerical/sales workers.
8  The results are relatively consistent 
across occupations; however, there are some notable exceptions.  The percentage of 
workers using computers only matters for the wages of supervisors, clerical, and 
production workers.  Increased training of supervisors raises their wages, but increasing 
the proportion of workers trained in any of the other occupational categories appears to 
have no impact on their wages.  Supervisors are paid more if they work in unionized 
establishments.  Production workers are also paid more in unionized firms, while clerical 
and sales workers that are working for unionized firms that have a high proportion of 
workers involved in regular meetings or have profit sharing also have higher wages.  
  Since we have information on wages paid in both 1993 and 1996, we are able to 
examine how changes in worker characteristics and workplace practices are related to 
changes in wages in the establishment.  We do this by estimating a first differenced fixed 
effects model.  In this way we are able to control for any time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity in the establishments that might be biasing the estimated coefficients in the 
cross section results.  When we examine the determinants of average hourly wages we 
find that higher average education in an establishment leads to higher wages; increasing 
education by one year leads to more than 8% wage growth.  Beyond that though, there is 
little else of statistical significance.  Interestingly, the computer variable is no longer 
significant suggesting that the significance of the computer variable in Tables 3a and 3b 
might have been driven by other unobserved qualities of the establishments.
9
   
  However, as shown in Table 4, when we look at individual occupations we find 
evidence that employers do appear to compensate at least some of their workers for being 
more educated or engaging in certain HPW practices.  Education has a significant and   17
positive relationship to wages for all groups except production workers and supervisors.  
In addition, increasing the proportion of clerical and sales workers trained over the period 
1993-1996 has a positive and significant impact on their wages.  Managers in unionized 
establishments with a high proportion of non-managerial workers meeting regularly in 
groups are paid a wage premium.  Supervisors in establishments with a larger proportion 
of workers involved in job rotation and self-managed teams are paid a premium as well.  
While the pay of managers and supervisors is higher when they are working in an 
establishment with some form of HPW practices, the pay of production workers seems to 
be unaffected.  While this finding may at first glance seem surprising (that managerial 
workers are being paid a premium to work in establishments where there is more 
involvement among unskilled workers in the production process), this is consistent with 
the idea that these practices increase the demands on managers and supervisors as well.  
Managers and supervisors are now responsible for organizing the production workers and 
providing an environment conducive to their participation in decision-making.  In 
addition, they must distill the information they receive from lower-level employees, 
suggesting a need for increased compensation.  Finally, this result is also consistent with 
the supposition that in order to ensure that supervisors do not sabotage efforts to increase 
participation of production workers in decision making (since this could undermine their 
own authority) a wage premium must be paid.  There still may be other time-varying 
unobserved characteristics of establishments, such as changes in managerial quality, 
which might be biasing these estimates.  However, these findings are suggestive of a 
premium being paid to non-production workers relative to production workers to work in 
a HPW environment.   18
Wage Inequality and Workplace Innovation 
  To see how technological and organizational change has affected relative wages, 
we focus on the ratio of the average wage of non-production workers in an establishment 
to the average wage of production workers in an establishment, where non-production 
workers include managers, supervisors, technical and professional workers, and sales and 
clerical workers.  This is the standard grouping of workers by skill that is used in surveys 
such as the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufacturers.
10  Explanatory variables 
include measures of relative human capital (the ratio of average education of non-
production workers to production workers average education and the ratio of the 
proportion of non-production workers trained to the proportion of production workers 
trained), our measure of information technology (an indicator if more than 30% of all 
workers use computers), our vector of organizational variables, and demographic 
characteristics of the establishment.  Again, failure to address unobserved heterogeneity 
may bias our empirical results so we estimate the relative wage equation in both levels 
(using data from 1996) and first differenced (using data from 1993 and 1996 panel) in 
order to remove the time invariant fixed effects.  These results are reported in Tables 5 
and 6.   
Table 5 presents findings on the determinants of the ratio of nonproduction to 
production worker hourly wages using the 1996 cross section.  Column 1 presents our 
basic model of human capital, organization, and technology variables, while Column 2 
includes interactions between unionization and workplace practices.  Columns 3 and 4 
show the results when we do not include individual practices but instead use an index:  in 
Column 3, we use a count of the workplace practices (which ranges from zero to five,   19
depending on the number an individual plant has implemented) and Column 4 uses an 
index of workplace practices.
11  These results suggest that technology and worker 
characteristics have a significant impact on wage inequality within an establishment; 
computer diffusion reduces inequality, while increased disparity in the education of 
nonproduction workers relative to production workers increases it.  More women and 
minorities are associated with higher inequality, as is higher turnover.  Large firms have 
less wage inequality, ceteris paribus.   
Among the workplace practices, we find little of statistical significance in the 
cross section results.  Profit sharing appears to reduce inequality in non-unionized firms 
but slightly increases it in unionized firms.  However, the findings change when we re-
estimate this inequality measure in a fixed effects model over the period of 1993-1996.   
As shown in Table 6, with the exception of the relative education variable, other worker 
characteristics and computer use become insignificant.  The collapse of the computer 
variable in the fixed effects estimation is similar to what happened in the wage equations.     
Interestingly, we again see that, controlling for time-invariant establishment 
characteristics, introducing workplace practices increases relative wage inequality.  The 
presence of significant job rotation increases wage inequality, as does profit sharing in 
unionized establishments.  Both the count measure and the index of workplace practices 
suggest that these high performance workplace practices actually increase within-
establishment inequality.  This is consistent with the wage results of Table 4 where it 
appeared that non-production workers such as managers and supervisors were paid wage 
premiums to work in HPW businesses while production workers did not receive a similar 
premium.   20
Workplace Innovation and Employment Changes 
  A final outcome we examine is whether high performance workplace practices 
have an impact on large-scale employment reductions within establishments.  To do this, 
we look at the impact of 1993 workplace practices and establishment characteristics on 
an indicator variable equal to one if the establishment has undergone substantial 
reduction in the number of employees by 1996.  We use 5% and 20% as cutoffs and look 
at total employment and then production worker employment.  Table 7 presents these 
results.   
  Over forty percent of the establishments in our sample experienced a net 
employment reduction of 5 percent or more and almost twenty percent experienced a net 
reduction of 20 percent or more.  If we concentrate on this latter category of large layoffs, 
we see that the establishments most likely to undergo such a large net reduction in 
employment by 1996 were large employers, had high turnover and were part of multi-
establishment firms in 1993.  In terms of the relationship between HPW practices and 
large layoffs, we see a mixed picture.  Those establishments that had a high proportion of 
workers in self-managed teams or that had profit sharing in 1993 were more likely to 
undergo a larger reduction in net employment.  But those establishments that had a high 
proportion of workers in job rotation or that were unionized with a high proportion of 
non-managerial workers meeting regularly to discuss workplace issues were less likely to 
have experienced such large net employment reductions.   
When we examine only production workers, we again see that larger and multi-
establishments were more likely to reduce production worker employment by 20 percent 
or more over the 1993-1996 period.  But those establishments that had a higher   21
proportion of workers using computers or higher average education in 1993 were less 
likely to have experienced such large drops in production worker employment.  As with 
overall employment, those establishments with a higher proportion of workers in self-
managed teams in 1993 were more likely to have laid off a significant proportion of 
production workers by 1996, except if they were unionized establishments.  While this 
analysis is primarily descriptive in nature it does suggest that while some HPW practices 
do seem to be associated with employment reduction as Osterman (2000) found, this does 
seem to vary by practice and whether or not the establishment with the HPW practice is 
unionized. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
During the period 1993-1996 U.S. manufacturing employers have been actively 
engaged in workplace re-organization, and these changes in workplace practices have 
played a significant role in the recent rise in manufacturing productivity.  While 
manufacturing firms are enjoying the benefits of these technological and managerial 
innovations, some workers appear to also be sharing some of these gains in the form of 
higher wages.  Though these results may be affected by data quality issues, we find that 
these gains do not seem to be evenly distributed within establishments.  Non-production 
workers working in HPW environments appear to be paid a wage premium while 
production workers’ pay seems unaffected.  Perhaps, then, it is not surprising to find that 
these same HPW practices appear to increase with-establishment wage inequality.  
Finally, the association between HPW practices and large net reductions in employment 
seems to be a mixed picture, with some practices, such as self-managed teams, associated   22
with greater employment reductions while other practices, such as the percentage of 
workers involved in job rotation, associated with lower employment reductions.  More 
generally, our empirical work suggests that there are significant differences between 
unionized and non- unionized employers in the impact of organizational change on all 
three of the outcome measures examined in this paper.    23
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>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 
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Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.  Unionized=1 if an 
establishment answered yes to the question “Is your establishment represented by a union or unions?”  28
Table 2:  Changes in Organizational Structure (Panel Data) 





(Moved out of 
Group) 
% Stayed the 
Same 
 
>20% of Non-Managerial 
Workers in Self-Managed 
Teams 
 









>20% of Non-Managerial 
Workers involved in Job 
Rotation 
 
16 12  72 




17 11  72 
>50% of Non-Managerial 






















Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.    29
Table 3a 
Wage Equations All Workers 
1996 Cross Section 
















































































High Performance Work Systems 
>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 

















>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 


















>50% of Non-Managerial Workers 
















Union*>50% of Non-Managerial 








Union*>20% of Non-Managerial 
















Number of observations  524 524 183  183 
 
Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.  Unionized=1 if an 
establishment answered yes to the question “Is your establishment represented by a union or unions?” 
Standard Errors in (), * denotes significant at the 10% level.  All estimation has been done using the Huber-
White estimator of variance to correct standard errors.  All equations also include two-digit industry 
dummies.    30
 
Table 3b 
Wage Equations by Occupation 
1996 Cross Section 
 
































































































High Performance Work Systems 
>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 





















>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 






















>50% of Non-Managerial Workers 






















Union*>50% of Non-Managerial 












Union*>20% of Non-Managerial 
























Number of observations  469 520 501  590  556 
 
Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.  Unionized=1 if an 
establishment answered yes to the question “Is your establishment represented by a union or unions?” 
Standard Errors in (), * denotes significant at the 10% level.  All estimation has been done using the Huber-
White estimator of variance to correct standard errors.  All equations also include two-digit industry 
dummies.    31
Table 4: 
Wage Equation 
Establishment Fixed Effects 
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High Performance Work Systems 
>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 





















>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 
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Union*>50% of Non-Managerial 












Union*>20% of Non-Managerial 



































Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.  Unionized=1 if an 
establishment answered yes to the question “Is your establishment represented by a union or unions?” 
Standard Errors in (), * denotes significant at the 10% level.  All estimation has been done using the Huber-
White estimator of variance to correct standard errors.     32
Table 5 
Non-production/Production Workers Wage Differentials, 
1996 Cross-Section 


















































































High Performance Work Systems 
Count of workplace practices     .001 
(.013) 
 
Index of workplace practices       .003 
(.014) 
>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 






>50% of Non-Managerial Workers 






>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 





























Union*Profit Sharing   .13* 
(.07) 
  
Union*>50% of Non-Managerial 




Union*>20% of Non-Managerial 














Number of observations  209 209  209  209 
 
Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.  Unionized=1 if an 
establishment answered yes to the question “Is your establishment represented by a union or unions?”   33
Standard Errors in (), * denotes significant at the 10% level.  All estimation has been done using the Huber-
White estimator of variance to correct standard errors.  All equations include two-digit industry dummies.    34
Table 6 
Non-production/Production Workers Wage Differentials, 
Establishment Fixed Effects 
 



























































 Technology   










High Performance Work Systems 





Index of workplace practices       .04* 
(.02) 
>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 






>50% of Non-Managerial Workers 






>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 































Union*Profit Sharing   .19* 
(.09) 
  
Union*>50% of Non-Managerial 





Union*>20% of Non-Managerial 







.5230 .5297  .5259  .5264 
p-value from F test  
H0: All Coefficients==0 
.020 .016  .005  .007 
Number of observations  138 138  138  138 
   35
Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.  Unionized=1 if an 
establishment answered yes to the question “Is your establishment represented by a union or unions?” 
Standard Errors in (), * denotes significant at the 10% level.  All estimation has been done using the Huber-
White estimator of variance to correct standard errors.  36
 
Table 7 
Employment Reduction (1993-1996) 
Logit Results  
(Odds Ratios Presented, Z Values in Parentheses) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Employment 
down 5% or 
more 
Employment 




5% or more 
Production Worker 
Employment down 
20% or more 
Worker Characteristics 
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>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 


















>50% of Non-Managerial Workers 



















Union*>50% of Non-Managerial Workers 









Union*>20% of Non-Managerial Workers 



















Number of observations 
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Note:  Unless otherwise noted, variables refer to all workers in the establishment.  Unionized=1 if an 
establishment answered yes to the question “Is your establishment represented by a union or unions?” 
* denotes significant at the 10% level.  All equations also include two-digit industry dummies. All 
explanatory variables were measured in 1993.     38
 
                                                           
1 There have been numerous case studies (e.g. Krafcik (1988), Womack, Jones and Roos (1991), 
Ichniowski (1992), Berg, Appelbaum, Bailey and Kallenberg (1996), and Batt (1995)), intra-industry 
studies (e.g. Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Arthur (1994), Kelly (1996), Bailey (1993) and 
Dunlop and Weil (1996)), and studies based on more nationally representative samples of firms (e.g. 
Ichniowski (1990), Huselid (1995), Black and Lynch (1996), Black and Lynch (2001), and Black and 
Lynch (2000)) that have all found a significant impact of these workplace practices on the productivity of 
U.S. businesses. 
2. The first survey was designed by Lisa Lynch in collaboration with EQW Co-Directors Robert Zemsky 
and Peter Cappelli).  The survey was supported by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, 
US Department of Education. 
3. Response rates are higher in manufacturing than in non-manufacturing establishments.  The response 
rate in manufacturing in the 1994 survey was 66% while non-manufacturing was only 61%.  In 1997, the 
response rate in manufacturing was 61% while only 52% in non-manufacturing.  For more detailed 
information on response rates for the EQW-NES II see the following internet address:  
http://www.irhe.upenn.edu/cgi-bin/cat.pl#nes1997. 
4 The training questions were at the end of the survey, which means the non-response rates to these 
questions are particularly high in the second interview. 
5 As a result, our final sample for the 1996 establishment level estimation is significantly smaller than the 
initial 2,479.  Because of missing values, our cross-section wage equation has 524 establishments and our 
employment equations have 840 (missing values for employment could be replaced by the LRD values 
when available).  
6 We have also included other HPW practices in our estimation such as benchmarking, number of 
managerial levels, and employee-supervisors ratios but none of these practices were significant for the 
outcomes we examine in this paper. 
7 Note that we cannot distinguish whether this variable reflect the fact that firms with high turnover pay 
lower wages to each worker or firms with high turnover have a disproportionate number of new workers 
with less experiences which leads to lower average pay. 
8 Note that the sample size in the equations with all workers (and in the summary statistics in Table 1) 
differs from those equations estimated by occupation.  The differences are driven entirely by missing 
variables.  If one occupational wage is missing (in any occupation) and the establishment reported that they 
did in fact have workers in that occupation, we are unable to compute the average wage.   
9 We also looked at composite measures of workplace practices, including a count of the number of 
practices within an establishment and an index created using factor analysis.  Neither of these was 
significant.  Full results are available from the authors upon request. 
10 Another possible specification might classify clerical/sales workers as low-skilled.  The average 
education of clerical/sales workers in our sample (12.7 years) lies between that of production workers (11.8 
years) and supervisors at (13.2 years).  Because of this, we also ran our regressions using the alternative 
definition of low-skilled which included clerical/sales workers and obtained results entirely consistent with 
those presented in the paper.   
11 The index of workplace practices was constructed using principal components analysis, which showed 
one principal component with an eigenvalue greater than one; this one accounted for 30% of the total 
variance. 